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REPLY TO CRITICS
Seana Valentine Shiffrin*
I am grateful for the thoughtful and challenging responses
of the group members and pleased to have the opportunity to
elaborate upon the thinker-based approach in reply. I wish Ed
Baker were still here to continue the conversation alongside.
Unfortunately, my remarks will be tentative, speculative, and
most regrettably, partial. The excellent issues and questions
posed by the commentators deserve a longer and more detailed
treatment than time and space allow.
Broadly speaking, the responses fall into four categories,
raising methodological issues, questions about scope, worries
about under-inclusivity, and worries about over-breadth. I will
address them only roughly in turn, because, given overlap, a
strict separation would prove too rigid.
METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE
Vince, Steve, Tim, Jim and Susan posed a number of
pertinent questions about the methodology operating in the
backdrop of my proposed approach, its scope, and the
theoretical advantages I associate with it.
My general approach is to start with the First Amendment
and to ask what arguments for freedom of speech would make
the most justificatory sense of its inclusion and its deontological
status in a legitimate constitution. My short answer is that a
legitimate, operative democracy both presupposes its citizens are
functional thinkers and moral agents and, further, must treat
them as such to respect their human rights. To respect the status

* In addition to my gratitude to the group members, I owe particular thanks to
Heidi Kitrosser, Steve Shiffrin and Terry Stedman for reactions to this draft and to
workshop participants at Pepperdine Law School, Queen’s University, University of
Virginia School of Law, and the NYU Colloquium on Legal, Political and Social
Philosophy, whose critical reactions to A Thinker-Based Approach influenced this reply.
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and significance of its citizens qua thinkers, the state cannot
retain its legitimacy while undermining the conditions necessary
for the development and exercise of each member’s capacities
for free thought. Instead, given the significance of these
capacities to each individual and to our joint social project of to
cooperate and self-legislate justly, it must make the protection of
those conditions a foundational priority. A freedom of speech
protection is essential to that mission.
This immediately raises the question of scope and limits.
Jim asks, why, then, would there be a state action requirement in
the First Amendment? That is, why wouldn’t the thinker-based
theory condemn all limitations on the freedom of thought,
whether the source of the limitations was the state or a private
entity? In a complementary way, Tim might be read as asking,
why wouldn’t such an approach suggest requirements of positive
provision—to establish schools and libraries, e.g., rather than
merely to refrain from abridgment? Generally, mightn’t what
falls under a freedom of thought approach exceed what is
typically thought of as protected under a freedom of speech
rubric?
It is, in my view, a strength of the theory that it helps to
explain what state abridgments of free speech have in common
1
with private and social abridgments. It also seems like a strength
that the theory can explain the continuity between the idea that
a commitment to freedom of speech may require governmental
abstinence from active obstructing disfavored speech and the related idea that this commitment may demand certain positive
provisions by the government, including but not necessarily
limited to protection against hecklers and other forms of
attempted private censorship, as well as provisions to ensure fair
2
access to public fora for expression.
Let me start with Tim’s question about the relationship
between freedom of speech and freedom of thought. Tim’s
suspicion that there are aspects of freedom of thought that may

1. This is not a unique virtue of this theory (although it does not as clearly hold of
government-centered theories). For example, Mill’s truth based approach to freedom of
speech supplies reasons to be as concerned about social censorship as about
governmental censorship. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 161–64 (Penguin
Classics 1985) (1863).
2. Here, I agree with Tim wholeheartedly. See T.M. Scanlon, Comment on
Shiffrin’s Thinker-based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 327, 332
(2011).
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not be well-captured or well-protected fully by a ‘freedom of
speech’ protection may be correct. Although, for the most part, I
think the connection is fairly close. In any case, as I will later
argue (not that I take Tim to disagree), it is not a theoretical
defect if a freedom of thought protection ranges beyond a
strictly construed free speech protection.
Three points may clarify my view of the connection between
freedom of thought and freedom of speech: First (for most
3
people in most circumstances over an extended period of time),
freedom of thought cannot be achieved on one’s own, solely
within the confines of one’s mind, because (complex) thought
itself requires, for its development and refinement, access to
others’ thoughts and opportunities for the externalization of
thoughts to oneself and to others. Hence, there is a very intimate
connection between freedom of thought and freedom of speech.
If externalization of mental content or communicative access to
others is obstructed or otherwise significantly constricted, then
speech is not free and, in turn, thought is not fully free.
Second, some protections of freedom of thought are not
directly forms of free speech protection, as those terms are
commonly used, but because they either are so closely
connected, or they implicate when speech may be restricted,
they usefully fall under the label of a broadly understood ‘free
speech’ theory. Two examples may illustrate my point: First,
although direct efforts to manipulate others’ thoughts without
restricting or manipulating their speech might be thought to
jeopardize freedom of thought but not freedom of speech (or at
least not freedom of speech directly), that separation seems too
hasty. Some forms of thought control may take the form of
speech (e.g. hypnotic, bombarding, or deliberately false speech).
The thinker-based view would explain why that form of speech
would not fall under the free speech protection but, rather, why
that speech could be restricted (whether that speech is of
4
government or private origin). Other forms of thought control
3. I happily concede, as some have pointed out, that after childhood, a few, e.g.
monks, find an extended period of solitude clarifying (although most such people read
and write, even if they do not regularly speak).
4. My seeming openness to regulating individual, non-commercial, non-libelous
false speech offered to be taken as true may seem surprising given my strong free speech
orientation. My view on this matter is tentative, but I believe I concur with Ed Baker’s
view that intentionally false speech as such has only a precarious connection to the roots
of the free speech protection. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM
OF SPEECH 11, 34, 289 n.39 (1989). Everyday, intentionally false, testimonial speech that
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or thought interference might use no speech at all: e.g.,
electronic waves might be aimed at the brain to disrupt its
function. Here, though, we might point out that this case
implicates freedom of speech because the speech of the victim
would no longer be the product of authentically generated
thought (as would also be true of the prior case). Although our
primary aim in response to these scenarios should be to protect
the free thoughts of the potential victim, the connection to free
speech is not far.
Second, as Tim points out, access to information may be a
necessary condition of freedom of thought, but it may not seem
like the most natural locution to call restrictions on information
provision abridgments of free speech. My response here takes a
fairly similar form. Some withholding of information falls within
the legitimate purview of individual privacy (some aspects of
which are themselves essential to the individual qua thinker as I
discuss below); perhaps some withholding falls within the
purview of legitimate governmental secrecy. To fill out when
information should be made available would require
supplementing the thinker-based theory with a larger theory of
acceptable privacy and secrecy. That supplementation does fall
within the rubric of a ‘free speech’ theory because it concerns
what sorts of things the government (and others) must speak
about and what sort of speech they may legally refuse to engage
in; further, when information is illegitimately withheld, free
thought and free speech based on that thought is impaired. So,
although I will not offer a theory of how broad the Freedom of
Information Act should be and which part of it, if any, should be
constitutionally mandated, I do think that the theory of its scope
is an aspect of free speech theory and that the issue of
information provision at least implicates so-called “free speech”
5
values.
is offered to be taken as true by individuals that falls outside special categories (e.g.
perjury, commercial speech, defamatory speech) might nevertheless gain full protection
partly because its articulation is often part of an effort to sniff out the true and test one’s
convictions and partly because policing sincerity that thoroughly would generate subzero
chill and many false positives. See also Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First
Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 1107, 1110 (2006) (discussing, among other things, “First Amendment limits on
government power to control deceptive assertions in several different realms, and the
much less appreciated First Amendment limits on government speech restrictions that
carry out or impose deception by the government”).
5. Every aspect of the topic of information provision may not fall into the zone of
judicially enforceable constitutional mandate, however, for two main reasons (both of
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Third, the adequate conditions for freedom of thought may
include measures like adequate food and other economic
resources. Anti-poverty measures are not standardly thought to
fall under the category of ‘freedom of speech.’ I surely grant that
intuitive, ordinary language point. Whether the free speech
protection should be more broadly interpreted to exude a
penumbra that includes such measures that render the free
speech protection meaningful is a venerable issue that implicates
larger issues in constitutional theory and economic justice, the
resolution of which is not entailed by the thinker-based theory
6
on its own. I am content here merely to acknowledge that if one
cares about the adequate conditions of freedom of thought, one
would be lead to care about its material as well as its intellectual
conditions, whether under a constitutional ‘free speech’ lens or
under some other viewing device.
Some might take the thrust behind some of these questions
to suggest that a thinker-based theory seems to require more
than the First Amendment is generally taken to cover. Further,
this is a flaw because the theory is not well-tailored to explain
and interpret the First Amendment speech clause, in particular. I
agree that a concern about the social and material conditions
adequate for free thought entails a larger agenda than is covered
by freedom of speech, at least the judicially enforceable branch
of that topic as it has been standardly interpreted. Perhaps the
standard interpretation is correct. I am not sure of that (or of its
particular limits) but the thinker-based approach is not
inconsistent with the view that the First Amendment tackles
which are themes that repeatedly come up below): some of the boundaries of permissible
secrecy and privacy may reasonably be expected to evolve and morph over time. So,
some aspects of information provision might be reasonably thought to be better handled
by a constitutionally-guided and inspired legislature that (in theory) has a greater
capacity for agility and flexibility to respond to changing circumstances; further, some
issues of information provision go to the quality of thought and not the adequate
conditions necessary for freedom of thought, so that some matters of information
provision, e.g. funding for some research perhaps, may promote free speech values but
not be strictly required by a free speech commitment.
6. See also Susan H. Williams, Free Speech and Autonomy: Thinkers, Storytellers,
and a Systemic Approach to Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 399, 412 (2011); SUSAN H.
WILLIAMS, TRUTH, AUTONOMY, AND SPEECH 222 (2004) [hereinafter WILLIAMS,
TRUTH]. For a related prior discussion of such issues, see Frank Michaelman’s famous
effort to argue that anti-poverty measures may have a constitutional foundation (albeit a
different source) in Frank Michelman, Constitutional Welfare Rights and A Theory of
Justice, in READING RAWLS 319, 343–44 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975) (discussing
education in the context of Rawls’ opportunity principle). See also Frank Michelman,
The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 13
(2003).
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only part of that agenda. The thinker-based approach may
suggest that the foundations of freedom of speech may demand
the government (and perhaps other social institutions) do more
than the First Amendment, itself, requires.
7
That consequence in itself should not feel surprising. The
theoretical foundations of the 4th and 5th Amendments most
likely involve privacy values whose natural extension and
satisfaction conditions range beyond merely protecting against
unwarranted searches and seizures and self-incrimination. Other
First Amendment theories also have (salutary) overhang.
8
Democracy theories, like Jim’s and Robert’s, draw on a
commitment to democracy whose implications (e.g., one personone vote) range beyond how to treat speech on public affairs or
more broadly, speech within public discourse.
That does not mean that any of these theories suggest that
the First Amendment, properly interpreted, does away with the
state action requirement or the abridgement requirement, for
that matter. “First Amendment values” may be promoted or
satisfied by activities that the First Amendment itself does not
require. In most circumstances, I take it that improvement or
greater funding of the library system promotes First Amendment
values but may not be required by the First Amendment. The
acceptance of First Amendment values surely requires
governmental attention to whether there is an adequate
educational system in place. Perhaps the First Amendment itself
requires government intervention or provision, as a backstop, if
and on those occasions when other methods of provision fail, so
that adequate schooling becomes unattainable for some portion
of the citizenry, thereby threatening citizens’ minimal abilities to
develop and exercise their capacities for free thought. Perhaps
the First Amendment requires even more, especially when
considered in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment’s
9
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Resolving this
7. Indeed, this is a closely related cousin of the worry about whether speech is, and
need be, special. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker Based Approach to Freedom of
Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 283, 303 (2011).
8. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A
Discussion, 97 VA. L. REV. 477 (2011); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the
Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011).
9. A range of views on that question and its negative resolution are found in San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35–39 (1973) (deferring to
the legislature in choosing the most effective means to promote First Amendment
values); id. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “any classification affecting
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question fully would require a theory of where to locate the line
between what inaction, if any, abridges freedom of speech and
what inaction merely fails to promote the highest achievement of
free speech values, some aspects of which may be left to nonconstitutional policy and some aspects of which may correctly lie
at the feet of citizens to exercise their freedom well. Full
identification of these lines would involve, among other things, a
full theory of ‘abridgement’ as well as a theory of the substantive
due process protection and how it bears on how we interpret the
First Amendment guarantee and vice versa.
Now we return to state action. The need for a larger
constitutional theory to resolve some issues of scope and
coverage is not uniquely triggered by the thinker-based theory,
but arises for virtually all free speech theories. All First
Amendment theories also have to answer the question why, if
their theories have broader scope, are the constitutional
protections more limited, e.g. why is there a state action
requirement embedded in the First Amendment? (They need
not, however, interpret the state action requirement as narrowly
as the current Court and may be open to broader understandings
of how private structures assume state functions or in what way
the government may be responsible to ensure that they do not
impede an adequate foundation for freedom of thought and
adequate opportunities for its expression.)
One adequate answer to this question is to interpret the
state action requirement as rather more contingent and
institutionally motivated than as deeply principled. Our
Constitution is, generally, focused on enabling and constraining
the state. Considering how, institutionally, we may implement
our compulsory commitment to the conditions necessary for free
thought, we may—in creating a state—think it crucial to ensure
and to underline that the state itself not transgress the
boundaries associated with this commitment. We may take this
stance because: the state has historically posed a large threat to
the realization of these values; or because this stance is the most
salient symbolic public commitment to this value we can make
while still preserving legislative flexibility in other domains; or,
education must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny” because “education is inextricably
linked to . . . the First Amendment”); id. at 112–17 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (similarly
arguing that the “fundamentality of education” calls for heightened scrutiny for
classifications affecting education and discussing First Amendment argument for
constitutional basis for an equal funding requirement).
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because the state constitutes the background structure and
framework within which other social practices and institutions
may evolve and be better managed through direct legislative
control or through individual, decentralized control; or some
combination of such reasons.
All First Amendment theories, to be complete, must
address whether the state action requirement is interpreted in a
narrow way to require positive state action or whether certain
forms of state inaction constitute acquiescence or a failure of
duty of a sort that amounts to a governmental abridgment of
freedom. I cannot take on the larger range of issues that
question raises here, but I see no reason to worry that question is
harder for a thinker-based theory to answer than the other free
speech theories that must confront this issue as well. I think we
can make progress on a wide variety of issues without resolving
all boundary issues at the outset.
To turn to a different issue, my claim that the thinker-based
argument offers ‘greater unity’ and is more foundational than
rival theories elicited, in somewhat different forms by Vince,
Steve, and Tim, the quite reasonable question why that matters
and why it should speak in favor of the theory. I may have put
more emphasis on these features than they merit. A sheer
theoretical preference for simplicity and unity should not be
thought to do much work. On the other hand, many freedom of
speech violations seem to offend against the same value—that,
for instance, something similar is at stake between the disparate
10
fact patterns of Brandenburg v. Ohio, West Virginia Board of
11
12
Education v. Barnette, and Cantwell v. Connecticut. A theory
that can vindicate, or more modestly, make some sense of the
perceived connection between them would be desirable. Further,
it seems desirable to avoid arbitrary distinctions or privileging of
some activities over another, even when they—at bottom—are
manifestations or aspects of the same value. Identifying the
foundational value underlying speaker interests, for example,
may help to ensure that we do not accidentally arbitrarily

10. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (overturning the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader for
advocating violence and holding incendiary speech to be protected unless it is directed
and likely to incite imminent illegal action).
11. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overturning a state law compelling school children to recite
the pledge of allegiance).
12. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (overturning a state law requiring religious solicitors to
obtain a license).
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privilege speaker interests, per se, over other interests that share
in the same underlying value but that perhaps, in the past, have
not been under threat and hence have not been the subject of
13
litigation. Identifying foundational interests may also help us to
identify which free speech protections should be regarded as
bedrock because a fundamental speech value is at stake, and
which represent important, but perhaps instrumental or
prophylactic, responses to particular, contingent social
conditions. This kind of categorization may, I think, make a
14
difference to how we approach some doctrinal questions.
Whether we view a protective stance against dissent as
motivated by the special intrinsic value of dissent or by its
tendency to be vulnerable in many political conditions may
make a doctrinal difference. The latter view may give rise to
special forms of epistemic scrutiny of regulations to ensure they
are not motivated by conformism or the desire to protect the
status quo, or to strong protections against retaliation for
unwelcome speech or for other institutional, structural
protections to ensure that vulnerability isn’t exploited; the
former view may lead to more content-based distinctions, such
as the sometimes misleading suggestion that parody in particular
15
should be protected. Finally, unity that is achieved without
oversimplification or false reduction may make the theoretical
apparatus easier to apply, at least if (and this may be a
questionable assumption) it is more manageable to work out the
implications of one principle than to engage in the difficult task
of relating one principle to another.
Steve and Tim reasonably ask how other principles of
freedom of speech and of other constitutional values relate to
this principle. It is an entirely reasonable question the answer of
13. For these and related reasons, I have reservations about Frederick Schauer’s
(spoken) suggestion at one of the Virginia symposium panels that a free speech theory
should be designed around the threats freedom of speech actually faces. Although this is
a natural target of attention, it is also important to theorize those freedoms that now
seem entirely safe and internalized, both to protect against the emergence of threats that
now seem unthinkable and also to recognize and validate the basis for the public
acceptance, enjoyment, and acclaim for the right.
14. Depending upon how other matters in constitutional theory are resolved, it may
also make a difference to whether a constitutional approach to the question is apt and
what governmental agents should bear responsibility for its resolution.
15. See e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled
Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 871 n.87 (2005); Amici Brief for Eugene Volokh &
Erik S. Jaffe at 7–10, McFarlane v. Twist, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Miss. 2003) (No. 03-615), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1058 (2004), reprinted in 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).
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which I will have to defer to another occasion. I agree, however,
with what is implicit in their question, namely that I do not think
the thinker-based theory is the exclusive theory of the value of
freedom of speech that should resonate in our jurisprudence.
DILUTION
Another methodological concern echoed in some of the
critiques, e.g., by Jim and Vince, is one about dilution: A strong
free speech theory with wide scope will entail a broad free
speech protection that will inevitably be infringed or misapplied.
The rationalizations rallied, in turn, to support these
curtailments will themselves be used in a way that jeopardizes
the most essential forms of speech. A more modest theory, one
that at least identified and prioritized some core instances of
speech, would provide a more secure theoretical bulwark for
recurrent wavering about free speech.
These predictions may, unfortunately, be accurate. Still, I do
not believe that the ideal critical theory should be attentive to
them in a way that results in substantial modifications. There is
something quite strange about criticizing the content of a theory
on the ground that it will be misunderstood, defied, or ignored in
a particular institutional context or by particular institutional
actors. The predictability of a pernicious misunderstanding does
not demonstrate that the content, as such, is mistaken. By and
large, a theory of the value of speech and of free speech should, I
think, avoid barbering itself simply because we worry others are
unreasonably scissor-happy, especially if the point of the theory
is to illuminate and educate about when trims are apt and when
growth, even to the point of shagginess, has more to recommend
it. The more appropriate way to respond to concerns about
mistakes in institutional implementation is in part, if the theory
is correct, to do more by way of justification and education to
avoid misinterpretation, rather than to assume interpreters are
incorrigible.
That said, I have no particular objection at the level of
application to temporary and/or contingent institutional
maneuvers, including doctrinal constructions, to protect against
predictable errors. Identifying some sorts of speech as ‘core’ or
‘untouchable’ may well serve the aim of ensuring that an alarm
alert is triggered if restrictions threaten it. That strategy may
ensure the predictable ebb and flow of politics and judicial
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adjustments and reactions is not permitted to grow into a flood
that threatens the levees.
I would find more objectionable any (theoretical)
stipulation, unsupported by a substantive ground for the
distinction, that such core speech is qualitatively distinct from
that speech deemed outside the core and that it is sufficiently
distinct that the former falls in the scope of protection and the
latter falls entirely outside it. I regard that stance as an
overreaction to the perceived threats to freedom of speech and
one that is inconsistent with the best theoretical arguments for
the value of speech. Furthermore, arbitrary, strategic distinctions
upon which a great deal of weight is put do not, I think, exert
much protection in the long term. Their disingenuousness is
detected and, consequently, they cannot support the burden they
are asked to carry.
THE NARRATIVE APPROACH TO AUTONOMY
I am in large agreement with Susan, as she herself suggests.
16
Indeed, we may be in more agreement than she thinks.
Although I believe our possession of autonomous capacities (for
freedom of thought) merits respect, I agree that their
development, expression, and the full achievement of their
potential is a process that transpires over time and that the free
speech protection aims to protect access to that process as well
as instances along the way. I also agree that it is important to ask
how social systems support or detract from the conditions that
give rise to free thought. Indeed, I am not certain how deep our
disagreements go, but I will mention a couple methodological
points of potential divergence.
Susan emphasizes, as I do not, characterizing autonomy as
17
an effort to narrate one’s self and one’s commitments to others.
Although this idea of autonomy has a great deal of insight in it
and certainly captures a large part of what is of value in many
exercises of autonomy, I eschew this characterization for a few
reasons. First, Susan’s position is motivated by a skepticism

16. See Williams, supra note 6, at 404 n.23. Although, in a minor way, we may
differ more than she thinks. In an approving tone, Susan characterizes the appeal to the
thinker as a metaphor. Williams, supra note 6, at 404. I confess I do not mean it to
operate as a metaphor, but since I am unsure what motivates her characterization, I do
not know if much hangs on this difference.
17. Id. at 404–06; WILLIAMS, TRUTH, supra note 6, at 131–37.
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18

about choice upon which I do not rely. An account of
autonomous thought as thought that is not dictated or scripted
by forces distinct or orthogonal to the relevant reasons that bear
19
on what is thought about need not endorse or reject such
skepticism. In that respect, my model is less controversial.
Second, I worry that a narrative approach places an overemphasis on speech about or central to one’s self, one’s
20
character, or the arc that characterizes one’s life. It also
(perhaps only by connotation) seems to suggest a self already
fairly far along in construction. I worry that this over-emphasis
may orient our appreciation of the value of speech to speech
about ourselves, rather than also directly on efforts to
understand the world. I also worry it arbitrarily privileges speech
that fits one’s narrative structure over speech that is out of
character, and it does not (as) directly capture the speech of
children and young adults whose self-narrative and
21
commitments are still fledgling. One way to capture the
difference between us (again perhaps only in connotation or
perhaps more on emphasis and type of justification) is that my
theory aims to offer an autonomy justification for speech
instances (whether as thinker, speaker, or listener) as each an
aspect or instance of the free development and exercise of the
18. Williams, supra note 6, at 408–10; WILLIAMS, TRUTH, supra note 6, at 149–50,
200 (downplaying the importance of choice to narrative autonomy).
19. Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 409–11 (describing relevant form of authenticity).
20. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 148 (“In order for [a narrative] process to qualify as
an exercise in autonomy, the meaning at issue must be personal: it must relate to the
meaning of one’s own life.”). See also Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 286 n.7 (marking a related
reservation about Joshua Cohen’s emphasis on significant speech in his deliberative
democratic approach).
21. See Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 287 n.9. I should clarify that, although I remarked
in the target piece that children’s speech should partake in First Amendment protection
more than current Court doctrine allows, I do not think adults’ and children’s speech
rights run in absolute parallel. For example, I surely believe that mandatory education
requirements are simpler to justify with respect to children (because they must come to
possess minimally developed capacities for thought) than they are for adults. See also
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1232 (2010) (“[O]nce citizens have achieved adulthood, efforts
to enroll adults in compulsory forms of education violate their rights of autonomy and, in
particular, their freedom of thought.”); Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 880–88 (explaining,
among other things, why children’s associational rights are less robust than the
associational rights of adults). A more nuanced theory would also have to be developed
for the mentally disabled and demented who are, as I have argued elsewhere, capable of
some forms of autonomy but may nevertheless reasonably be subject to different
treatment to respect that autonomy. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Autonomy,
Beneficence, and the Permanently Demented, in DWORKIN AND HIS CRITICS 195 (Justine
Burley ed., 2004).
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autonomous thinker; Susan’s theory characterizes the relevant
exercise of autonomy as occurring over an extended period of
time for which individual speech instances are partial
components but not fresh exercises of autonomy as such.
Third, the emphasis of Susan’s theory is one in which
communication with others is taken as the paradigm case and the
paradigm source of value or justification, whereas my theory
aims to allow personal diaries and musings and other purely
intra-personal communication to be as paradigmatic as
communications to others, but without assimilating intrapersonal
communication to the model of communication between
22
people.
We both strive to stress the role of the social and the
relational in accounts of individual autonomy. In my theory,
access to and opportunities for social communicative relations
are essential for a complete set of apt conditions for thought
formation, evaluation of ideas, and moral relations, which
themselves are the sites of individual autonomy; in Susan’s
theory, social communicative relations are more directly the sites
of autonomous exercise.
ELITISM
Finally, Vince wonders whether the theory is overly
rationalist and even elitist. He worries it might be interpreted to
extend only to highly deliberate and articulate speech, issued
from thinkers self-consciously dedicated to nurturing and
developing the interests I articulate, or, more mildly, to imagine
23
their speech as the core of what is to be protected.
I am anxious to dispel this impression. Being, acting like or
aspiring to a bookish bent is neither a necessary condition of free
speech protection, nor is the cultivation or production of such
figures an aim or background ideal of the theory. Ironically, I
had hoped to design the theory to avoid the pitfalls of hyperintellectualism, but I may have contributed to a misimpression
by not drawing attention to this aspiration.
22. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 150–54 (narrative autonomy is dependent on social
connection); id. at 200–04 (arguing that, at least for symbolic speech, the speaker must
intend to convey a meaning and the audience must understand that the speaker is
attempting to convey a meaning).
23. See Vincent Blasi, Seana Shiffrin’s Thinker-Based Freedom of Speech: A
Response, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 310–12 (2011).
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By stressing the role of emotional responses and reactions
as a part of the way rational capacities encode their responses to
the world and manifest them to others, the articulated interests
of thinkers to which the theory aims to be responsive are not
24
restricted to the discursively cognitive. This more expansive
conception of the person is then reflected in the theory’s effort
to cover, directly and at the outset, art, music, banal
interpersonal conversations as well as associational connections,
25
whether or not they have an articulate point. By stressing the
26
role others may have to play in forming one’s thoughts as well
as the welcome tentativeness of some speech, the theory also
makes clear that speech need not be well-formulated or
articulate to gain protection or to be celebrated by the theory.
True, the theory stresses the connection between opportunities
for externalized thought and access to the thoughts and reactions
of others and the conditions necessary for citizens to become full
moral agents and the sort of informed individuals who can make
27
most sense of our democratic commitments. Still, those
desiderata may be promoted by the free speech guarantee while
being met by a wide range of people in a variety of ways
(although I certainly would defend the opportunity to develop
one’s cognitive capacities into a bookish bent).

24. Indeed, I might also add that the need to externalize mental content whether to
gain distance from it, to help to formulate it more determinately, or to convey it to others
holds true as much of children, the mentally disabled, and those suffering dementia as of
the highly educated and the basic normative importance of ensuring the opportunity to
satisfy that need does not substantially vary depending upon the sophistication of the
mind at issue.
25. See Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 285–87; Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 875 (“The
autonomous agent must have some ability to control what influences she is exposed to, to
what subjects she directs her mind, and whether she, at all times, directs her mind toward
anything at all or instead ‘spaces out’ and allows the mind to relax and wander.”).
26. Steve characterizes this view of intimate associations as instrumental, but
stresses that friendships and other intimate associations have intrinsic value, involving
substantial and substantive forms of altruism. Steven H. Shiffrin, Freedom of Speech and
Two Types of Autonomy, in 27 CONST. COMMENT. 337, 344 (2011). I hasten to agree.
Because the thinker-based approach stresses the importance of having access to the
opportunities necessary to be known as a distinctive individual as well as to behave
morally and treat others well, see Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 291–92, I regard it as
(implicitly) acknowledging these intrinsic values and as arguing that the free speech
protects this avenue of access for thinkers. Whether they follow that path and use it well
is, of course, an aspect of their freedom and responsibility.
27. Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 294–96.
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UNDERINCLUSIVITY
Some worry a thinker-based theory will, in some respects,
be insufficiently protective of speech. Relative to other
autonomy theories, the thinker-based theory confronts fewer
issues of under-inclusivity because it subsumes (and unifies) the
sweep of both speaker and listener-based theories, while also
directly addressing those threats to the authenticity of the
thought process that may not directly impinge upon speaker or
listener interests as they are often articulated.
So, in reply to Eugene, although protecting access to the
speech of the dead is typically disconnected from the thinkeroriented needs of the deceased to communicate with
contemporaries, that speech squarely connects to each living
thinker’s interests in access to other minds and their perceptions
as a way of understanding one’s environment. Understanding
one’s environment frequently involves understanding history
and the information contained within historical perspectives. So
too, access to the speech of the deceased connects to thinkers’
interests in being well treated by other agents, from whom
relevant insights, messages, perspectives, and information may
be owed and conveyed, even once they are deceased.
In this respect, ensuring protection for the speech of the
dead also protects contemporary thinkers’ interests qua
speakers. Discharging moral duties we now have to future
generations may require that we have the free opportunity to
communicate with them and to contribute to the human cache of
knowledge by leaving a record of our thoughts that persists after
our deaths. This current interest of ours may be frustrated
retroactively by a future regulation or restriction on distribution
of the speech of the dead. In sum, both speaker and listener
interests are stymied by restrictions on access to the publications
of the deceased.
This rationale for protecting the speech of the dead does not
threaten to unravel the argument I earlier sketched to explain
why non-press, for-profit commercial or corporate speech might
legitimately receive a different sort of treatment or be subject to
a different level of review on a thinker-based account. That
argument, broadly rendered, was that, for reasons related to our
economic endeavors, the structure in which commercial and
corporate speech is produced does not show sufficient sensitivity
and pushes against the issuance of authentic, sincere speech by
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individual thinkers. Rather, its content is largely determined by
the needs imposed by the marketplace, the structure of which is
not designed to serve the underlying interests of thinkers as
such, but rather to make such authenticity highly unlikely and
possibly destructive to the speakers’ own economic interests.
The structure encourages indifference to the (perceived) truth
and so, its output has a strained and unreliable connection to the
interests, even the listener-based interests, that propel a thinkerbased protection since these are keyed primarily to the sincere
expressions of speakers’ perceptions, beliefs, opinions, etc., and
their genuine efforts to represent the world and themselves.
Of course, corporate speech is written and conveyed by real
individuals, but given the corporate hierarchical structure as well
as the pressures associated with the larger economic structure
within which they speak, there is no reason to think this speech
reflects their personal, sincere thoughts; the fact individuals
author the speech does not undercut my argument that the
speech may be more susceptible to regulation, although it would
suggest that such regulations should not demand individuals
engage in insincere or false speech. And, of course, as I argued
earlier, any motivation for regulation must itself be consistent
with acceptance of the values underlying the free speech
protection. The ethical difficulties presented by those tensions
between the content dictated by employers’ agendas and the
employee’s sincere convictions, however, may suggest a much
more speech- and dissent-protective approach to employee
speech than the Court has recognized in such cases as Connick v.
28
29
Myers, and, more recently, in Garcetti v. Ceballos.
Susan asks why corporate and commercial speech is any
more determined or coerced than speech by members of a
30
religious group; I take it that, with respect to some groups, her
concern is that members’ dissent may earn them expulsion and

28. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). See also STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND
AMERICA 110 n.144 (1999) (arguing that the Connick decision is less
than “admirable”).
29. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). I discuss related tensions and pressures on integrity that
employees may face in the contract context when they form promises on behalf of
companies and place their own integrity at stake, but may not control the decision
whether to perform and may be under structural pressure to treat promises on behalf of
corporations less seriously than promises they initiate on their own behalf. Seana
Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708,
746–49 (2007).
30. Williams, supra note 6, at 407–08.
THE MEANINGS OF
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this is analogous to the market death that Crest (to take a purely
hypothetical case) would suffer if it gamely admitted in its
advertising that its product was worse than its rivals, just higherpriced. I do not deny that sincerity and unpopular speech may
often come with great costs, but I regard the differences as
follows: The market and legal pressures for Crest to do what it
can to stay in business are tighter and greater than the pressures
for a religious thinker not to change her mind in light of her
sincere doubts. Moreover, Crest is a simpler entity with a less
complex set of interests. When a believer changes her mind in
light of her sincere doubts, she serves her own interests as a
thinker directly by responding to what she takes to be the truth.
Her continued affirmation of religious tenets furthers her
interests as a thinker only if that affirmation is actually sincere.
Further, although her expulsion from a religious community may
involve tremendous costs, it does not (typically) involve her
complete eradication. Whereas, Crest’s interests to maximize
profit and to survive in a competitive market are not furthered
by its sincere admission that its products are inferior (except and
only insofar as it has instrumental reasons to admit this when it
believes others have already perceived this). The actual sincerity
or insincerity or accuracy of its communications are irrelevant to
its interests, except to the extent that these play an instrumental
role in gaining or retaining market position, because of others’
perception or because of the sort of regulations I am arguing are
constitutionally palatable.
Much more should be said in a full treatment of this topic,
including something about the more complex case of non-profit
corporations that operate in a market environment and the case
31
of other market actors pursuing morally infused agendas. But,
in brief, as a general, probably exception-ridden matter, I take
for-profit, non-press commercial speech to be different from
individual and expressive associational speech (and therefore
subject to different standards of review, not necessarily
prohibitable outright) because of the fiercely competitive and
fairly inflexible environment in which the former operates and
because the commercial entity’s interests are so narrowly limited
so that the accuracy and sincerity of its speech are valuable to it
only if instrumentally that is made to be the case. Its narrowness
31. I began a tentative discussion of the morally motivated market actors in Seana
Valentine Shiffrin, Compelled Association, Morality, and Market Dynamics, 41 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 317 (2007).
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is no surprise: the non-press commercial entity is not a really a
person and with some important exceptions, for the most part,
the quality of its speech and its products do not intrinsically
enhance or detract from the satisfaction of its interests or aims
depending upon whether they are sincere, accurate, morally
sensitive, or wildly reckless. These features do not hold to as
great a degree of individuals, nor are they structurally true of
them.
OVER-INCLUSIVITY
Jim raises two concerns that roughly amount to worries
about over-inclusivity: his worry that this approach would
protect harassing speech and the concern that it would extend
high levels of protection to scientific research, even that research
whose dissemination threatens significant harm. As I read him,
he believes both that such protection is implausible but also, that
whatever its merits, courts could not live with this result; judicial
methods of avoiding it, however, would inevitably threaten the
protection of core, democratic speech. So, although the worry
originally registers as one about overinclusivity, its after-echo
resonates as one about overly scant protection: in an institutional
context, a theory that extends such wide protection will
inexorably be scaled back in blunt ways that threaten essential
speech.
The first case is the simpler one to address. As I have
argued, it is to the credit of the thinker-based approach that it
handily protects speech between intimates in private as well as
between citizens in the public sphere. I think it may readily,
however, distinguish harassing speech on the grounds that it
does not involve a consensual communicative relation. Although
as thinkers we have an interest in expressing our thoughts and in
being known, we do not have a right to command the personal
audience of any other thinkers we like, irrespective of their
interests in hearing us out. That would not be compatible with
the other’s autonomy as a thinker since each of us also has an
interest qua thinker in being left alone and maintaining a sphere
of privacy free from unwanted intrusion by others. One cannot
be a free thinker while being subject to intrusions that overtake
one’s mental agenda. Protecting opportunities to satisfy thinkers’
interests both in privacy and in forging relationships with others
can be done by permitting restrictions on nonconsensual but
targeted and intrusive contact, even that contact that solely
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involves speech, while still protecting consensual interpersonal
communication as well as public proclamations and revelations,
even if offensive and even if they concern particular individuals.
So, if Melvin directs his confessions at Miranda personally and
she objects, his speech to her thereafter may be curtailed on the
grounds that it infringes upon her thinker-based interests in
maintaining a sphere in which she may enjoy privacy of the
32
mind. Assuming they do not share a workplace, I do not think
she has a legitimate claim, however, to enjoin all efforts by
Melvin to engage in purely public forms of self-revelation, even
if his revelatory remarks are about her and offend her, so long as
33
she in particular is not made to listen to his remarks.
As for scientific speech, the thinker-based approach
probably would extend protection fairly far, as Jim suspects. I
am less convinced that this constitutes an embarrassment for the
approach. Although publication of formulas for virulent
biotoxins makes me very uneasy, so too does the history of past,
and prospect of further, state suppression of scientific research
that threatened governmental or corporate power or the state’s
32. I discuss some of the reasons why anti-discrimination laws that limit speech
content may have a permissible role in workplaces and other spheres of predominantly
economic activity in Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 877–78.
33. Thus, the outcome of Snyder v. Phelps seems correct, despite the abhorrent
behavior of the protestors. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (finding peaceful
protestors who picketed a military funeral on public land 1000 feet from the funeral and
who displayed provocative and aggressive signs were shielded from tort liability for
intentional infliction of emotional distress by the First Amendment). Although the
Phelps’ organization unquestionably behaved in a brutally insensitive way, the fact that
the protest was located a substantial distance from the funeral and that Mr. Snyder was
unaware of the content of their protest signs until he later encountered videos and other
reports of them in the public sphere, via television news coverage and later on the
internet, suggests the 1000 foot time, place, and manner restriction was sufficient to
protect the Snyder family’s reasonable privacy interests on the occasion of the funeral. In
that light, Mr. Snyder’s complaint seems to reduce to offense at the content of the
Phelps’ speech and its issuance on and association with the occasion of Matthew Snyder’s
funeral. The sphere of privacy necessary for thinker autonomy cannot reasonably be
construed to extend so far as to prevent non-libelous, sincere public discourse about an
individual just because its critical content is offensive or distressing.
It is arguable, however, that the U.S. approach does not extend far enough to
protect against incursions to privacy caused by non-consensual truthful revelation of
purely private information; such revelations arguably violate an individual’s discretionary
power over whether and when to reveal herself to others. England currently takes a
different approach. Contrast Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd., [2004] UKHL
22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding a tabloid liable for violating the
privacy of a famous model by revealing specific details of the model’s drug rehabilitation
treatment) with Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (finding unconstitutional a
Florida law permitting civil liability for publication of the accidentally revealed name of a
rape victim).
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orthodoxy about religion, safety, or other matters. Scientific
speech may constitute an arena in which we regulate strongly the
uses to which it is put and otherwise, we have to depend upon
the good judgment of fellow citizens about what should be
published, what knowledge would better remain privately held
and undisseminated, and, on the audience side, to what uses
information should be put. This seems to me little different than
much of the rest of free speech practice. Incendiary and
offensive political speech may merit legal protection, but in a
well-functioning polity, citizens will have to develop and exercise
good judgment about when to engage in it and when, as
audience members, to take it seriously. Not all political
sentiments should be voiced or acted upon just because we offer
the opportunity to voice and consider them. Having the
opportunity to engage in speech may be essential to protecting
the autonomy of thinkers, but that does not mean that the theory
recommends its exercise. It shouldn’t be news that, as with
democracy more generally, a free speech regime requires a
measure of trust in fellow citizens that will, at times, create
anxiety and discomfort. The thinker-based theory does not
freshly introduce this dependence.
Of course, some transmissions of scientific information may
constitute a part of a criminal attempt or an effort to further a
criminal conspiracy, when provided at the relevant time to
someone attempting to use the information to commit a crime.
Such uses could be regulated as falling more on the speech-act
side than on the pure speech side. Finally, I should observe that,
doctrinally, assuming scientific and political speech are treated
with parity, then situations where publication would create
significant, immediate harm might submit to regulation
compatible with the application of strict scrutiny. But, I concede
that the intermediate cases Jim is most worried about further
35
developed in his excellent article on the subject, in which
publication of scientific research may threaten important ends
but not compelling state interests, may well be protected on this
analysis.
34. The relevance of much scientific speech to policy decisions as well as historical
governmental efforts to suppress scientific speech that might embarrass the government
or generate the basis for state liability suggest that it is not so evident that scientific
speech does not make a contribution to our resolution of public questions. If so, it is less
clear the problems Jim raises are clearly segregable on a democracy approach.
35. James Weinstein, Democracy, Individual Rights and the Regulation of Science,
15 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 407 (2009).
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Finally, Steve wonders whether my effort to justify strong
protections for art entail that the same protection should be
extended to image advertising that would extend to
informational advertising. His question implies a concern that
image advertisements are more powerful in illicit ways—that
they influence viewers in substantial ways that are not
perceptible to them. This, of course, may also be true of political
rhetoric and persuasive speech. An aspect of the responsibility of
autonomous thinkers is to be aware of the influences they may
36
be subject to and to assess and police that influence. On the
other hand, some modes of communication may circumvent or
evade our capacities to engage in such self-regulation either writ
large or writ small; thereby, they may threaten thinkers’ capacity
37
to form authentic, unscripted thoughts. I have in mind the
popular conceptions of brainwashing techniques, subliminal
messages, and hypnosis (which, notably, often involve words). I
do not know whether our popular conceptions are accurate or
apocryphal or whether some forms of image advertising (or, as
some have alleged, pornography, fighting words, or face-to-face
hate speech) work on us in ways that significantly obstruct or
impair the exercise of responsible assessment and selfmanagement. If substantial evidence suggested that image
advertising resisted or stymied otherwise competent, responsible
36. Full treatment of this issue would require a more elaborate account of what
responsibilities listeners may be expected to bear, but that, unfortunately, is beyond the
scope of this discussion. Briefly and generally, though, it seems fair to ask listeners to
exercise responsibility over how they allow the sincere speech of interlocutors to affect
them (e.g. whether to believe or remain skeptical, whether to guard against emotional
impact or use emotional force as a guide to plausibility, etc.), assuming that speech does
not disable or circumvent the capacities that undergird such responsibility. For,
exercising that responsibility involves using the thinkers’ critical capacities while at the
same time permitting the speakers’ capacities for thought and expression to be fully and
freely implemented; the opportunity and value of both exercises underlies the
justification and value of free speech and its protection. It is arguable that this general
argument may have less traction, however, when the speech involves matters about
which listeners’ responsibility could only be exercised competently if the listener had
well-developed expertise that it is unreasonable to expect listeners to cultivate. Hence,
we might subject speech by experts directed at lay people to higher standards of accuracy
or care. So too a heavy burden of epistemic responsibility, broadly construed, on the
listener may also be inapt in the case of insincere, false speech, particularly with respect
to information that is not readily accessible or publicly verifiable by listeners (e.g.
speakers’ mental contents). Deliberately false speech may also jeopardize many of the
conditions under which speech generally has value and this also cuts against the claim
speakers have a foundational interest in expressing deliberately false speech (represented
as true). I discuss the threat lies pose to the moral function of communication in Seanna
Shiffrin, Lies and the Murderer-Next-Door (unpublished manuscript).
37. Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 288, 299–300.
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agents’ reasonable efforts at effective methods of avoidance,
reflection, assessment, and revision, then I believe a thinkerbased approach would have the resources to suggest such speech
was more susceptible to regulation to limit such exposure to
destructive and disabling effects, especially with respect to
children. Of course, these points are only suggestive and a more
comprehensive treatment would be necessary to settle the issue.
Regretfully, I have not attempted to answer many worthy
issues raised in the group’s rich and stimulating replies. With
respect to those issues I have addressed, the treatment is overly
cursory. I look forward to thinking further about these questions
for some time to come and I reiterate my appreciation to the
group for their critical engagement with these still preliminary
ideas.

